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Abstract 
 
This paper reflects on the policy formation process in the burgeoning area of government’s 
involvement venture capital finance (VC) over the two decades 2000-2020. It looks at both 
why and how government VC funds (GVC) have evolved. The increasingly common vehicle 
of ‘hybrid’ co-investment funds, which include both public and private VC investors 
managed by a jointly approved private fund manager, is analysed. The evolution and greater 
refinement of public intervention in VC markets over time is acknowledged while noting that 
significant operational challenges remain. There is some evidence that later iterations of GVC 
programmes have started to add net value which may imply a public-policy learning process. 
A fluctuating supply over time for venture capital finance, particularly at the earliest stages of 
firm formation and growth, suggests the benefits of well-designed and complementary 
government venture capital activity. The rubric of Ten Meditations is employed as a device to 
communicate both problem and prescription across the academic/policy maker divide. The 
paper is intended to be relevant to policy makers while grounded in robust academic research. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The rationale and impact of government venture capital (GVC) is controversial and its proper 
design and execution is an ‘urgent topic’ for scholars and policy makers (Colombo et al, 
2016). Guerini and Quas (2016) likewise note that little is known about the effective actions 
of GVC and that existing research evidence is ambiguous. When the original 12 Meditations 
paper was published as a book chapter (Murray and Lingelbach, 2010), it similarly 
recognized this need for greater scrutiny by focusing on the challenging public policy goals 
of several governments which sought to assist in the creation of a national venture capital 
industry de novo. The generic efforts of governments in advanced Western economies to 
encourage professional equity investors to establish and grow the supply of risk capital were 
documented. The primary focus of public policy interest was in the encouragement of early-
stage, venture capital whereby new and young enterprises of high potential were supplied 
additional capital and expert business advice in order to facilitate their genesis and rapid 
growth (Da Rin et al, 2006; Hellman and Puri, 2002). As such, this focus reflected a growing 
realization (and commitment) by governments as to the critical contributory role of 
entrepreneurial finance in engendering growth and innovation within a modern economy 
(BIS, 2012). Stemming from early work on the importance of institutional environments 
(LaPorta et al., 1998, 2000), the concept of ‘entrepreneurial ecosystems’ has significantly 
increased in popularity (Isenberg, 2010). Accordingly, an environment of efficient and active 
new enterprise formation was also early recognized as a critical complement to an effective 
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national innovation policy (Mason and Brown, 2013; Kenney, 2011; OECD, 2008, 2015, 
2018a, b; Rigby and Ramlogan, 2013).  
 
Politicians likewise were quick to support the goal of a vigorous domestic venture capital 
industry based on a universal admiration of the Silicon Valley phenomenon (Kenney and von 
Berg, 1999). Importantly, the attraction of venture capital as a policy vehicle appeared to span 
the political spectrum with parties of the left and right being equally enamoured by the 
potential of risk capital to accelerate technological innovation and economic resurgence 
(Faria and Barbosa, 2014; Grilli and Murtinu, 2014). This growing policy awareness, evident 
from the early 1980s, had its intellectual foundations in academic research conducted in 
1970s and 1980s on the significant economic contribution of young firms. (See, for example, 
Birch, 1979; Storey et al, 1987.) Coincidentally, this period coincided with the early growth 
of VC industries in both the US and the UK (Coopey and Clark, 1995; Gompers and Lerner, 
2004) although the first examples of the modern ‘classic’ VC firm were created immediately 
after World War II1 (Bygrave and Timmons, 1992).  
 
The scope of the original 2010 paper constrained entrepreneurial activity to the compass of 
entrepreneurial finance, and particularly equity finance (aka ‘risk capital), provided by 
external and professional investors outside the founders of the business. For many high 
growth/high potential businesses in new technology markets, access to debt is highly rationed 
if not unavailable given their limited attractiveness to traditional bank lenders (Westhead and 
Storey, 1997; Colombo and Grilli, 2007). This paper looked at public policy efforts primarily 
in the period post the ‘technology bubble’ of the year 2000 up until the advent of the Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008. It concluded that governments’ efforts had frequently been 
disappointing despite the very considerable public resources applied to encouraging local 
venture capital activity over a protracted timespan. This limited success in policy terms was 
not seen in the absence of growth in venture capital activity. On the contrary, later-stage 
venture capital – and particularly private equity (PE) investment – grew continuously and 
significantly from the 1990s in Europe, North America and increasingly Asia (Coller Capital, 
2015). The failure - from a policy perspective - was that venture capital conducted by 
professional investment teams via traditional, limited liability partnerships (LLP) increasingly 
metamorphosed into later-stage PE activity. Seed and start-up activities were abandoned by 
the majority of VC general partnerships (the investment team) in favour of later-stage, 
secondary financing activity.  
 
In this environment, the limited supply of professional VC activity at the earliest stages of the 
firm’s life cycle was attenuated by growing equity investment from two sources: 1) a 
significant growth in the activities of ‘informal investors’ aka Business Angels2 (Kerr et al, 
2014: Lerner at al, 2015; Mason and Botelho, 2014) and; 2) a growing role for the state 
acting as an exclusive investor or as a major co-investor in VC activity (Grilli and Murtinu, 
2014; Kramer-Eis et al, 2015; Rigby and Ramlogan, 2013)3. In both the growth of business 
angel finance, and subsequently in easing the regulatory environmental constraints for 
‘crowdfunding’ activity (Collins and Pierrakis, 2012; Ernst and Young, 2012), the state has 
 
1 See page 8 
2 The state played a major role in the encouragement of BA activity via financial support for BA networks as 
well as offering BA investors a range of tax breaks on early-stage investments (Nightingale et al, 2009). 
3 In the last five years, the arrival of ‘equity crowdfunding’ could also be seen as a third response to rationing of 
the supply of classic venture capital (Hornuf and Schweinbacher, 2014; Collins and Pierrakis, 2012). 
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played a major indirect role by facilitating both the legal environment and providing a range 
of incentives to informal investors4.  
 
The original paper sought to identify and assess the generic issues that were seen to have 
affected the efficacy of public policy prescription in the venture capital space. These 
influences were identified, classified and ordered using the metaphoric device of a set of 
twelve (latterly revised to ten) meditations. The present paper seeks to develop the original 
discussion and analysis over a longer period of Government VC activity, and in a policy 
environment in which entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial finance have an increasing 
salience. Brief reference will also be made the recent phenomenon of ‘unicorn’ young firms 
and the manner in which external investors have sought to encourage rapid growth 
particularly in newly discovered technology-enhanced markets for products and (particularly) 
services. The last years of the present decade have witnessed dramatic growth in the VC 
funds directed to unicorn-status young enterprises with firms reaching multi-billion dollar 
valuations while still not generating positive cash flows. This euphoria, which is also shared 
by some government policy makers, shows some elements of a return to the unsustainable 
valuations of nominally technology-based young firms seen in dot.com crash of the year 
2000. Venture Capital has always been a ‘fashion industry’. 
 
 
Meditation (definition) 
 
a. The action or practice of profound spiritual or religious reflection or mental 
contemplation.  
b. Continuous thought on one subject; (a period of) serious and sustained 
reflection or mental contemplation. 
 
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (2007) 
 
During the first years of the present century, most national governments in the West had very 
little direct experience of venture capital activity. The USA and the United Kingdom were 
both outliers5 in having established important venture capital and private equity industries 
from the early 1980s. As a consequence of the immaturity of venture capital as either a 
domestic or international industry, the majority of national policy makers were obliged to 
‘learn by doing’ and/or borrow from the limited, relevant experiences of equivalent public 
agencies in other countries. Apart from the dominant examples of the USA, the UK and 
possibly Israel - the latter particularly through the early (and much publicized) success of the 
1984-88 Yozma programme (Avnimelech, 2009) - governments have had few illustrations of 
successful, public supported VC programmes which they could study and adapt to their own 
purposes. And even the extant VC programmes in North America (Brander et al, 2008; 
Lerner, 2002 and 2009); Australia (Murray, Cowling and Wei, 2010; Cumming and Johan, 
2014) and the UK (Cowling et al, 2011; Murray et al, 2010) could still be viewed as ‘work in 
progress’ with their final outcomes and long-run fund performance as yet unclear. 
 
 
4 The UK’s long-running Enterprise Investment Scheme, which was started in 1994, has provided attractive 
fiscal incentives to BA investors. 
5 A possible exception was the state of Israel which had adopted venture capital very early - albeit arguably as a 
satellite of the USA industry with which it was very closely associated. 
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In the current paper, we seek to revisit the international venture capital arena in order to 
assess the continued relevance or credibility of the meditations and their statements on the 
role and efficacy of the state as a venture capitalist. Excluding the much longer histories of 
the USA or UK, we now have a period of nearly twenty years to example government actions 
to promote and support venture capital investment. The number of countries which can claim 
a nascent or established venture capital industry has grown6 to embrace both developed as 
well as transitional and developing nations. Accordingly, we have arrived at a position where 
we have more experience and data to assess the robustness of publicly supported VC, and the 
continued salience of the original meditations themselves. During this period, a number of 
western democratic governments have also embarked on independent evaluations of their 
publicly supported VC programmes, some of which are in the public domain.7 Accordingly, 
we are able to start exploring the question of whether or not governments and their policy 
makers appear to be able to learn effectively from the actions and outcomes of other nations 
in seeking to develop their own VC industries.  
 
There is now a large and established literature on the potential value of venture capital for 
enhanced and accelerated economic development. While much of this literature was 
historically American (USA) in provenance, Europe is also providing more information from 
national governments, academia and the European Union’s own attempts to encourage VC 
activity.8 But the growth of this ‘asset class’ has not been uniform across all types and sizes 
of investment. Particularly, the capital market’s ability to meet the demand for early-stage 
venture capital – covering seed capital, start-up capital and early-stage growth capital – has 
continued to be particularly problematic (Wilson, 2015). Accordingly, the so-called ‘equity 
gap’ that this limited supply of risk capital has occasioned remains fruitful area for both 
governmental concern and academic research (Alperovych et al, 2018; DTI, 1999; Martin et 
al, 2005, Mason and Harrison, 2011). 
 
 
Enter The State 
 
The focus of this paper remains exclusively concerned with analysing governments’ ongoing 
attempts to increase the supply of early-stage VC by public policy initiatives and 
programmes. Since the global financial crisis in 2008, government has become the single 
most important supplier of early-stage venture capital finance in Europe and beyond.  
 
 
6 Using the European Union’s VICO database, Guerini and Quas (2015) identified 81 GVCs financing 183 first 
round entrepreneurial firms. 
7 The Nordic countries have each undertaken a number of evaluations of their VC programmes. In Denmark, 
Finland, Norway and Sweden, these independent studies have been published. The author has been directly 
involved in conducting VC programme evaluations in all Nordic countries other than Norway. 
8 See European Commission programmes, COSME and Horizon 2020, which both place substantial emphasis 
on plans to increase VC supply in the European Union. 
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Government has essentially two choices as to how it wishes to intervene directly in the VC 
market.9 It may decide to act unilaterally and add to the existing pool of available risk capital 
by financing a new VC fund or programme exclusively from the public exchequer. Here, the 
state takes direct action and itself becomes a ‘government venture capitalist’. Acting as both 
the ‘general partner’ (GP) and the sole ‘limited partner’ (LP), it assumes the full 
responsibility of investment selection, support and realization (exit). Conversely, the state 
may seek to encourage existing or new agents from existing capital markets to collaborate 
with it in the setting up of a co-investment scheme whereby both private and public parties 
are involved in raising the supply of venture capital. In this hybrid or indirect model, the state 
is a ‘special limited partner’ providing investment finance on such terms that will attract both 
private investors to co-invest and incentivise a general partnership to manage the fund. The 
state, as with all LPs wishing to maintain the tax benefits of a limited liability partnership, is 
proscribed from involvement in the operational investment decisions after setting the 
parameters of the fund’s investment activities. This hybrid model, utilizing the skills and 
experience of the VC sector’s investment professionals who are incentivised to meet goals of 
mutual commercial interest to themselves and the state, has become the predominant conduit 
for public support. That hybrid funds have to be structured and managed in a commercial 
manner which will attract private LPs, while putting the operational onus on a GP normally 
identified in a competitive bidding process, has governance and efficiency benefits obvious to 
an accountable government. There are several variants in the structure and operational 
incentives of both the direct and hybrid models of state-supported VC activity. Nor are the 
two models mutually exclusive. In a number of countries, for example, the publicly funded 
Vaekstfonden agency in Denmark10, the organisation makes both direct VC investments to 
Danish businesses while at the same time supporting indirect VC investment via a hybrid 
fund structure (Damvad, 2014). 
 
9 The government may of course influence the environment for venture capital investing indirectly via the 
taxation system. For example, the manner in which capital gains are treated in LLPs has major consequences. 
10 See details of the Danish Growth Fund at http://www.vf.dk/?sc_lang=en 
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A core assumption of this paper is that governments intervene in early-stage entrepreneurial 
finance as a consequence of a belief in the imperfection of existing market mechanisms 
which have resulted in an under-supply of risk capital. Public interventions are frequently 
premised on an understanding that they will be ‘temporary’. Given the state’s wider societal 
responsibilities, it may also intervene in problematic situations which are not regarded as 
relevant and/or attractive by other industry participants. For example, the limited access to 
venture capital by high risk groups including both scientists11 (innovation policy) and the 
unemployed (social policy) will concern separate departments of state but will not engage 
most private GPs with a strictly commercial focus. Thus, the state has responsibilities and 
goals for its VC actions that are far wider and, critically, over a longer time span than 
professional institutional investors. The latter’s primary fiduciary objective is engineering an 
attractive return at an acceptable level of risk on their funds under management. These funds 
are usually managed for a defined period of time. 
 
The hybrid VC model is an attempt to meld the benefits of both public and private actions by 
the effective alignment of disparate interests (OECD, 2004 and Wilson, 2015). In order to 
attract private investors, the state has to create incentives that address the key structural 
factors that make early-stage investing commercially unattractive. In essence, inducements 
have to be engineered that materially rebalance the risk/reward ratio of speculative risk 
capital investment in seed, start-up and early-stage companies. In summary, the state puts up 
a significant financial stake in a new VC fund. The advantageous conditions for the 
preferential allocation of investment returns to non-governmental investors encourage private 
institutional investors (LPs) to co-invest with the state in the new fund. The trade-off between 
public and private goals is that the fund must commit a substantial proportion of its raised 
capital to investee firms that are likely to be capital rationed in a free capital market. Such 
recipients of interest to the state are likely to include high potential start-up and early-growth 
firms most vulnerable to ‘equity gap’ issues.  
 
The genesis of this model is the seminal experiment in the USA of creating Small Business 
Investment Companies under the auspices of the Small Business Administration in 1958. 
While not free of problems in its execution (Brewer et al, 1996: Kleiman and Shulman, 
1992), generic characteristics of the SBIC ‘equity enhancement’ model have now been 
adopted in a range of modified forms by several other countries (including, for example, 
Australia, Finland, New Zealand and the UK being ‘early adopters’12). The central logic of 
the model is the use of public funds to leverage private investors’ returns. It is deemed 
appropriate for the state to do so in order to engineer a range of enhanced incentives that 
encourage private VC firms and LPs to work in partnership with the state in promoting 
greater investment activities in sectors of interest to public policy. There are several variants 
to the hybrid model but essentially the public exchequer becomes directly or indirectly13 a 
limited partner in the VC fund and provides a substantial proportion of the finance available 
 
11 Venture capitalists are only interested in ‘near to market’ scientific or technology advances. There is also a 
remarkable level of ‘fashion’ in which technologies move in or out of interest to VC investors over time. 
12 The author was directly involved in public VC preparation and evaluation with national governments in each 
of these countries. 
13 In the specific case of the SBIC, the government becomes a guarantor or underwriter to the private investors 
thereby increasing the amount of funding that can be raised from commercial sources at an attractive rate of 
interest.) 
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to the fund including investments made to the target group of companies. On occasions, the 
state may provide initial funding on a greater than 1:1 (public/private) ratio as a ‘special’ 
investor in the fund. This occurred, for example, in early iterations of the UK’s Enterprise 
Capital Fund scheme (ECF) or Australia’s Industry Investment Fund (IIF). In both cases, the 
state wished to incentivise private investors by the ‘signal’ that it was prepared to leverage 
preferentially their returns. In additional, the state will often only require a nominal return14 
in the event of a successful investment. If the investment fails, the state may also agree to be 
a subordinated investor preferentially writing off its own proportion of the monies committed 
to the portfolio firm or to the aggregate fund.15 
 
Recognizing the sensitivity of VC fund returns to ‘the time cost of capital’, some co-
investment schemes allow the public LP to invest before private investors’ money is 
committed. Further, the state will only seek a repatriation of its own finance when all other 
private LPs in the fund have first received an agreed share of capital gain contingent on a 
successful investment. Thus, the private fund gains the benefit of substantial public 
investment at a lower cost of capital and with the public LP bearing a greater risk of loss in 
the event of a partial or complete investment failure. This public leverage effect can have a 
material effect on the performance of the fund. Jääskeläinen et al. (2007) estimate that these 
asymmetric public/private risks and rewards can increase the net ‘cash to cash’ returns (i.e. 
Internal Rate of Return) to private LPs by up to 8%. However, these authors caution that such 
engineering of incentives can only work to increase the returns of a hybrid fund that has 
already generated some positive capital gain via its successful investment decisions.  
 
One of the most attractive incentive to a private investor occurs if the state is prepared to 
guarantee the level of risk of the investor (LP) by underwriting part or all of the contingent 
loss of individual portfolio investments made or the aggregate losses of the fund. Guaranteed 
underwriting of the investments of private agents in order to encourage them to undertake 
actions desired by the state has a considerable history that long predates its involvement with 
venture capital (Irwin, 2007). Public guarantees have been particularly widely applied to bank 
loans to SMEs (Cowling, 2010). Such security to capital providers becomes especially useful 
in circumstances where there is a high level of unquantifiable uncertainty. For example, the 
large and subordinated position of the state as a special limited partner in the UK’s Regional 
Venture Capital Funds, a programme launched in 2000, was necessary before private 
investors (including the publicly-owned international financing agency, the European 
Investment Fund) were prepared to co-invest in the new program. The terms accepted by the 
UK state as a ‘special’ limited partner included being ‘the first investor in and the last out’; 
accepting a cap on its returns; and, perhaps most importantly, becoming the recipient of first 
losses. These conditions meant that, in effect, the state protected private investors (LPs) from 
any net losses of the fund up to the level of its total public investment. However, such support 
also creates a level of moral hazard the costs of which are born by the state investor 
(Bergemann and Hege, 1998). 
  
 
14 Government’s target return is somewhat analogous to the ‘hurdle rate’ negotiated by LPs to determine a 
minimum investment performance before GPs are rewarded for their efforts. Essentially, government would like 
to see its return meeting its own cost of capital. 
15 Later public VC schemes in the UK have seen the state negotiate a position as preferred creditor (e.g. 
Enterprise Capital Fund Scheme) rather than as subordinate investor (e.g. Regional VC Fund Scheme) 
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Government Venture Capital – Asset or Liability 
 
VC fund programmes are long term and complex policy interventions. It is unlikely that their 
final outcomes will quickly be ascertained. Indeed, given the ‘J curve’ effect in an investment 
cycle, early indications will almost invariably produce negative results (Burgel, 2000). 
Further, policy makers have had to learn the professional skills of VC fund structuring and 
operation16. Accordingly, performance assessments of early government VC initiatives have 
often been negative in both the investment and policy outcomes of the programmes studied 
(Armour and Cumming, 2006; Bertoni et al, 2013; Brander, Egan and Hellmann, 2008; 
Cumming and MacIntosh, 2006). There are more positively qualified studies of GVC benefit 
(see Jeng and Wells, 2000; and Leleux and Surlemont, 2003) including, more recently 
(Alperovych et al., 2018; Cowling et al, 2011; Grilli and Murtinu 2014; Guerini and Quas 
2016) but they appear presently to be in a minority. Yet these disappointing early outcomes 
have also produced, albeit little documented, the important externality of government 
learning. In the UK, the poor outcomes of the Regional VC programme of 2000, was a 
material influence on the redesign of the later (2006 onwards) and more successful Enterprise 
Capital Funds programme. Likewise, while the Australian IIF programme started in 1997 has 
been praised, few academic observers noted the influence of the earlier unsuccessful 
Australian federal VC programme of the mid 1980s on the redesign of the IIF.17 This learning 
is also international. For example, Australian policy makers visited the USA, the UK and a 
number of European VC programmes before designing the IIF. Similarly, the European 
Commission has been particularly involved in cross-member learning on VC programmes. 
 
What has become clear is that GVC needs to be design and executed with considerable 
foresight if it is not to ‘crowd-out’ or other otherwise conflict with private investor provision. 
GCV has increasingly been designed to work as a complement to independent VC provision. 
That GVC can provide a ‘certification’ or ‘endorsement effect’ for growth-oriented 
businesses to private VCs (Guerini and Quas, 2015; Colombo et al., 2016) suggests that both 
private and independent VCs may over time be finding mutually supportive roles (Grilli and 
Murtinu, 2014). 
 
 
The Meditations Revisited 
 
The original meditations chapter noted the apparent limited ability of policy makers to learn 
from earlier (largely negative) programme experience. While defining and promoting the 
learning organisation has been a popular part of business school and consultancy endeavour 
(Argyris and Schon 1978; Fiol and Lyles,1985), there appeared to be less focus on the 
learning government. Here, Murray and Lingelbach (2010) argued that there was a 
particularly salient role for academic researchers in contributing to improved policy 
formation given their evidence-driven, long term and international perspectives.18 In this 
 
16 The British Business Bank created by the UK government is an excellent example of a policy vehicle that has 
evolved into highly professional vehicle for designing and administering VC policy instruments. In Europe, the 
same evolution of professionalism and influence can be seen in the European Investment Fund. 
17 Professor Murray proposed the IIF concept to the Australian Commonwealth government in his 1996 report to 
the Industrial Research and Development Board entitled “Australia’s Hour Glass Problem”. 
18 The ‘impact’ of researchers’ findings on external communities has become a major means by which the utility 
of university research and outputs is measured by government funders. In the UK’s university assessment 
programme, the Research Excellence Framework, impact is one of the three key elements to be appraised.  
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paper, the original meditations are revisited and refined in the light of continued venture 
capital industry evolution over the two decades 2010-2020. 
 
The meditations are each presented as an individual statement followed by a short rubric. 
Individual meditations seek to illuminate a particular area of GVC activity and its related 
policy actions and consequences. They are purposely couched in a challenging manner – both 
as a pedagogic device and as a means of encouraging practitioner engagement.  
 
 
M1:  Governments’ Innovation and Finance policymakers fit into two camps. They 
either believe in Charles Darwin or the Book of Genesis. In reality, most prefer the 
Creation Story. 
 
The state as ‘Creationist’  
 
Governments and their politicians do not like delayed gratification. The 3-5 year election 
cycle in most Western democracies favours a polity of bold public gestures and, ideally, 
quick wins (or at least tangible evidence of related improvements). For example, in 1996, a 
report commissioned by the Industry RandD Board of the Australian Commonwealth 
government suggested that Australia should consider an ‘equity enhancement’ program 
(similar to that employed in the Small Business Investment Companies Act in the USA) in 
order to stimulate an increased investment of early-stage, risk capital into technology based 
young firms. The report’s author suggested that Australia had an ‘hour glass problem’ 
(Murray, 1996), i.e. a systemic constraint in the sources of start-up and early-stage growth 
finance available to high potential young firms. Within 18 months, the Australian 
Commonwealth government had created the Innovation Investment Fund (IIF) with an initial 
A$100 million budget. The IIF was designed specifically to address capital (equity) rationing 
in young firms by crafting a supply-side policy instrument which provided private VC funds 
with public leverage of up to 2:1 (Cumming, 2007). Australian policy makers and legislators 
acted with exceptional speed to address a major concern of national enterprise and innovation 
policy. The logic underpinning the creation of the IIF program was to remove a constriction 
in the capital market and thus assist the rapid development of an emerging Australian venture 
capital industry in order to promote both enterprise and innovation (Wan, 1989). 
 
This enthusiasm to ‘kick start’ an Australian venture capital industry, while understandable, 
took little cognizance of the protracted period and the necessary environmental and 
institutional preconditions required to form a sustainable and profitable venture capital 
industry. American family trusts were doing proto-venture capital, equity financings in the 
1930s (Gompers, 1994). The first ‘classic’ VC firm, American Research and Development, 
incorporating a limited liability partnership legal structure was formed in the USA in 1946 by 
Professor Doriot (Hsu and Kenney, 2005) aided by significant support from Harvard 
University. Yet, the US VC industry could only credibly be seen as an autonomous, and 
distinct, asset class by the early 1990s – some fifty years later (Avnimelech and Teubel, 
2004). Similarly, the UK government employing the offices of the Bank of England created 
the Industrial and Commercial Finance Corporation (ICFC) and the Finance Corporation 
Industry (FCI) in 1945 as part of Britain’s post World War II reconstruction (Coopey and 
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Clarke, 1995). These two organizations became the forerunner of 3i plc.19 The ICFC and the 
FCI were a (delayed) policy response to the ‘equity gap’ first identified in Britain by the 
Macmillan Committee (1931) during the Great Depression. This persistent gap was then 
reaffirmed by periodic official government reviews of the financial circumstances of small 
and medium-sized enterprise finance. Yet, the UK, with the second largest VC industry in the 
world by the year 2000, was only a significant recipient and user of risk capital for early-
stage VC investments from the mid-1990s onwards. This was a period (1996-2000) 
characterized by an international boom for high-technology start-ups, several of which were 
funded by VC. This boom ended dramatically in the year 2000 when the ‘technology bubble’ 
burst. Given the investment losses incurred, it took the VC industry, large corporations via 
corporate venture capital initiatives (Birkinshaw et al, 2002) and institutional investors nearly 
a decade to return to early-stage, technology-based investments. During this first millennial 
decade, government stepped into the vacuum to become the single biggest supplier of early-
stage VC finance in Europe. 
 
While there is some evidence that the more recently established national VC industries in 
developed countries have taken less time to become operational and professionalized – see, 
for example, the Finnish VC industry (Maula and Murray, 2003) or the early growth of 
venture capital in Asia and Africa (Lockett and Wright, 2002; Olawale and Garwe, 2010) - 
the reality appears that the creation of a long run viable VC industry in even the most 
conducive legal, economic and technological environments is the product of decades of 
incremental and evolutionary change compatible with the wider commercial and political 
environments (Bygrave and Timmons, op. cit.). 
 
Since the early 2000s, several countries have created fledgling VC industries (EY, 2014).20 
Given growing experience, and the popular legal format of the limited liability partnership 
(LLP), governments can construct a hybrid model quickly. Limited partner interest can be 
‘managed’ by the generosity of the incentives given to private investors by the state co-
investor in an asymmetric returns model (Jääskeläinen et al, op cit). But the point is that what 
has reduced is the time to create an incipient, national venture capital industry. The 
experience and learning necessary to nurture a sustainable VC model, which can reward its 
(primarily institutional) investors with return levels commensurate with the significant 
illiquidity and risk of the asset class, is likely to still be measured over far longer periods. 
This latter task requires the complementary creation of an ‘entrepreneurial ecosystem’ 
(Isenberg, 2010; Mason and Brown, 2013; OECD, 2013; OECD 2018a, b) on which a 
flourishing VC sector is in part dependent. Groh et al (2014) in their analysis of the 
environmental conditions which favour the growth of national VC and PE industries argue 
that the depth of capital markets and investor protection/corporate governance are the two 
single biggest drivers of national VC activity.  These results reinforce the conclusions made 
by La Porta et al. (1997 and 2000) as to the centrality of ‘the rule of law’ in new enterprise 
formation and growth. Several nations21 currently promoting domestic VC industries are 
 
19 The name 3i – an acronym for Investors in Industry - was given to the merged organization formed from 
ICFC and FCI in 1983. 
20 The rapid international growth of VC activity is supported by the NVCA (June 2011) in a nine-country 
survey including 347 VC firms. 
21 The People’s Republic of China has invested very considerable public funds via city and regional 
administrations into state supported VC funds. At present, and with few exceptions, detailed and robust 
evidence of their investment performance is rarely available in the public domain. 
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likely to face considerable challenges in creating - and maintaining - these necessary 
environmental conditions.  
 
Thus, while the spread of VC activity as a policy prescription continues to grow rapidly, in 
part supported by public resources, the recognition of the protracted time and the associated 
preconditions for a successful and sustainable early-stage VC industry still remains poorly 
understood. The danger is that politicians do not appreciate the time span required to create 
effective, i.e. sustainable, investment programmes.22 One consequence of this inexperience is 
the creation in many countries of publicly supported VC funds with negligible chance of 
survival via the generation of commercial returns attractive to private investors. 
 
M2:  ‘Market failure’ is what happens when you don’t give me money. And a rational, 
objective and rigorous economic analysis is what has happened when I don’t give you 
money. 
The state as ‘apologist’  
 
In order to justify an intervention by the state which consumes scarce public resources, the 
political case usually needs to be publicly supported by a more independent, intellectual 
argument. Such arguments adopt the language of economics arguing in welfare and utility 
terms the ‘costs’ of not correcting an identified impediment to efficient market transactions. 
Technically, a ‘market failure’ exists when the price established in the market is less than the 
marginal social benefit of a good and thereby results in an under-supply from producers.  
 
The flow of early-stage equity finance to unproven young firms seeking to commercialize 
novel technologies in nascent or immature markets may give rise to several types of market 
failure. For example, when the market does not provide sufficient finance to meet the 
demands of young firms regardless of their willingness to pay the price (e.g. interest 
payment, collateral guarantee etc.) required. Asymmetric information increases the 
uncertainty and risks for institutional providers of capital, many of which would rather leave 
the market than provide finance under these partially informed and risky conditions. The 
absence of finance means that existing companies fail through lack of access to necessary 
resources, growth is restricted and/or new companies are not formed.23 Each of these 
outcomes may represent a significant social and economic cost to society. 
 
However, the technical term ‘market failure’ is often misused. The fact that many financial 
institutions are loath to finance young firms is not per se evidence of a market failure. Indeed, 
if the young firms are highly risky and/or poorly managed and the expected cashflows of any 
external investment does not provide an acceptable risk-adjusted return to investors, then the 
private decision to deny finance is unquestionably rational regardless of any social benefits 
forgone. Those arguing the case for intervention have to demonstrate that there are specific 
and resolvable circumstances that prevent capital markets from acting efficiently and finding 
an equilibrium price at which the market clears. In short, given the robustness with which 
 
22 Australia terminated its IIF programme in 2014 with the advent of the new government. 
23 This situation occurred post the 2008 global financial crisis with many bank lenders reducing existing and 
new loans to SMEs in order to protect their severely depleted balance sheets. Innovative young companies were 
particularly vulnerable (Lee et al., 2016). 
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many markets work despite public attempts at intervention, the onus of proof should be on 
those critics that argue that the market is not working. This scepticism should be particularly 
marked in professional equity markets where high levels of information and relevant 
analytical capabilities are often widely available. 
 
In practice, several governments assume the existence of a failure in the market for equity 
finance faced by young and small businesses as a default stance. Frequently, government 
policy documents repeat the term market failure with little acknowledgement to the 
ambiguity of research evidence supporting such a strong assertion (DTI, 1999). The generic 
existence or material effect of a SME ‘financing gap’ should not be assumed as an 
incontrovertible ‘given’, although disentangling supply and demand factors in determining 
whether such a gap exists can be technically challenging (Berger and Udell, 2006). This is 
not to suggest that market failure does not occur. SMEs are not homogeneous and young 
firms in technically complex markets or those enterprises growing rapidly may face different 
circumstances than the majority of SMEs. Further, there are structural conditions that suggest 
it is uneconomic for VC firms to provide small tranches of money to young firms (Murray 
and Marriott, 1998; European Commission, 2005). Many VC firms in the membership of the 
British Venture Capital Association (BVCA), no longer wish to offer applicant investee firms 
sums of money under a minimum of £5 million.24 The industry continues to ‘drift’ towards 
bigger deals post the challenging start-up phase (Cumming et al, 2009). Recent interest in 
‘unicorn’ businesses has only exacerbated the desire to allocate huge investment bids 
totalling hundreds of millions of dollars over multiple funding rounds to single companies 
deemed to have a ‘disruptive’ global model. However, this may not prevent some VC firms 
initially investing small sums in a large number of potential businesses25 in order to increase 
both market intelligence and opportunity (Ewens et al, 2018). 
 
However, this debate on the efficacy of VC markets obfuscates the fact that many firms 
seeking finance are not attractive enough to professional investors in an asset class where the 
risk/reward ratio has persistently acted against the interests of investors. VC managers are 
seeking a terminal fund performance measured in an internal rate of return (IRR) circa 20%.26 
Given that the majority of most portfolio companies will be full or partial failures, the VC 
model requires exception returns from a minority of successful investments, e.g. a >5-10x 
capital return over a three-year period. A tiny proportion of start-ups has this growth 
potential. The concept of ‘market or investment readiness’ which acknowledges that even 
high potential firms frequently have to be tutored in order to communicate their potential 
attractiveness to investors, implicitly signals that this failure is not exclusively a supply-side 
problem. This approach reappraises the market for SME finance from a demand-side 
perspective. It seeks to answer the conundrum that many SMEs argue that access to finance is 
extraordinarily difficult while at the same time venture capitalists frequently state with equal 
conviction that they have more money than opportunities in which to invest (Queen, 2002). 
However, the contemporary moves in the EU and several national governments towards 
 
24 For example, 3i plc, an extremely successful venture capital firm which was originally formed by the UK 
government in 1945 specifically to address the problems facing small businesses identified in the Macmillan 
Report (1931) no longer invests in the start-up and early-stage markets. Similarly, Apax Partners, an important 
early VC funder of start-up firms, in 2003 formally announced that requests for risk capital finance of under £10 
million would no longer be considered 
25 This practice is called “spray and pray” in the VC industry. 
26 Informal discussions with GPs. 
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increasing the regional distribution of VC finance27 indicates that public policy frequently 
allocates finance in a manner which reaffirms a dominant belief in supply-side failure. This 
lack of political will to provide a critical appraisal of the quality of firms seeking venture 
capital is one of the biggest constraints on public VC programme performance. In short, too 
many companies which should not receive venture capital continue to gain access to public 
VC programmes for reasons not connected to their commercial potential. For many private 
investors, public VC has always carried the stigma of allegedly ‘political influence’ in the 
investment allocation process. 
 
 
M3:  The rest of the world is not America. We can borrow but, ultimately, we have to 
find our own solutions. 
 
The state as ‘groupie’  
 
The USA continues to be the national VC industry against which all other nations of the 
world benchmark their performance. No other country or region has yet been able to emulate 
the global impact of Silicon Valley or Greater Boston28 as hubs of world class innovation, 
technological change and commercial success (Audretsch, 1995; Engel, 2015; European 
Commission and US Department of Commerce, 2005). Similarly, the US top quartile VC 
firms have consistently demonstrated the most attractive returns to venture capital investors 
(Rosa, Machado, and Raade, 2006; Cambridge Associates, 2018). Until the present decade, 
American companies have continued to dominant as the so-called ‘unicorn’ companies29 in 
the present networking (e.g. Google, Facebook, LinkedIn) and sharing (e.g. Uber, AirBnB) 
models of enterprise. This financial success has been based on the USA’s finely-honed ability 
to identify, nurture and finance the genesis and rapid growth of a disproportionate large share 
of the world’s most outstanding new companies (Gompers and Lerner, 1999) particularly in 
new and disruptive markets and technologies.  
 
However, the primacy of the USA as the global centre for high growth ventures has recently 
been challenged by China which has regarded venture finance as an important element of its 
national economic and technology strategies. China has been developing an entrepreneurial 
ecosystem since the 1980s with government financed VC being an important complement. 
The speed and success of this development has been impressive. By 2018, Chinese start-ups 
received 30% of the global VC funds raised that year (Pitchbook, 2019). China’s record of 
identifying and nurturing extremely high growth/high value young firms is now comparable 
to that of the USA. Hurun, a Chinese research body, estimates that in 2020 the US had 233 
and China 227 firms which collectively represented 79% of the world’s total of unicorn 
companies (Hurun, 2020). However, the international competitiveness of China’s firms and 
technologies remain embedded in an economy where Party interests may trump economic or 
 
27 See the role of the European Regional Development Fund programme of the European Union. 
28 In addition to Silicon Valley and Greater Boston, a number of smaller American locations or clusters arguably 
have sufficient size and centrality to enjoy world scale impact in ‘new knowledge-based’ investments. These 
include New York, the ‘North Carolina triangle’, Austin and Seattle. Outside these centers, the USA has little 
obvious advantage over Europe or other regions. 
29 Defined as a privately held start-up company with a valuation of over $1billion. A term coined in 2013 by 
Aileen Lee, the founder of the un-ironically named, Cowboy Ventures, Palo Alto, Ca. CBInsights, a venture 
research consultancy, estimates there were 500 unicorns valued at $1,585 million in November 2020 
https://www.cbinsights.com/research/most-valuable-unicorns/ 
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market imperatives. National VC industries in many countries have waxed and waned as 
policy priorities have changed over time. The long run success of China’s impressive 
entrepreneurial revolution still remains to be proven. 
 
This US success is in marked contrast to the disappointing returns that early-stage, classic VC 
has consistently recorded in the UK, continental Europe and beyond. There are exceptions to 
this generalization given the highly skewed nature of VC fund performance in Europe as well 
as America (Mulcahy et al, 2012; European Investment Fund, 2017). A number of European 
cities, including Cambridge, London, Munich, Stockholm are acknowledged centres of 
successful innovation and commercialization of new ideas and business models.  Similarly, a 
number of Europe’s best VC general partnerships have on occasions also recorded high levels 
of fund investment performance. Yet these European successes remains minor in comparison 
to the scale and consistency of American venture finance performance since the early 1980s.  
It appears that the US industry remains exceptional in its greater ability to recognize, nurture 
and benefit from risk capital investment in early-stage companies across a series of new and 
disruptive technologies and markets (Murray and Lott, 1995; Dimov and Murray, 2007). 
However, as Preqin’s 2012 special report on venture capital reconfirms, successful VC 
investment is a minority outcome. There is a marked and sustained difference between the 
upper quartile VC general partnerships and the rest of the industry. This difference between 
GPs tends to last over successive funding rounds. More experienced GPs are more likely to 
see their investee firms achieve an IPO (Sorensen, 2007). That is, the identification and 
funding by VC of exceptional businesses may not translate into attractive average and median 
investment returns for a national VC industry or its investors. 
 
The enduring success of a cohort of US originated, VC financed, portfolio firms, currently 
supported by the new paradigm of ‘unicorn’ companies (Kenney and Zysman, 2019), 
continues to excite policy makers and politicians. Accordingly, domestic government are an 
active participant in the establishing of VC industries in a growing number of countries in 
both the developed and developing worlds.30  Within countries, efforts are also made to 
support the greater regional distribution of venture finance, with the support of business angel 
activity particularly prevalent. Such policy ambitions are understandable despite their often 
weak economic and technological underpinnings.  
 
As the original meditations chapter noted, the concept of ‘path dependency’ would challenge 
the belief that countries could engineer for themselves a repetition of the USA’s history in 
innovation and finance (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997; Kenney and von Burg, 1999) leading 
to a Silicon Valley type outcome.  At best, national policy makers may be able to infer a 
number of generalizable lessons from the US experience. For example, much of the present 
success of Silicon Valley is based on the foundation of several large companies intimately 
connected to the defense industry from the 1930s onwards (Saxenian, 1994; Leslie and 
Kargon, 1996; Page, West and Bamford, 2005). The idea that creating a ‘military industrial 
complex’ comparable to the US (and possibly Israel) might be a precondition of a successful 
VC industry only emphasizes the need to think in terms of peculiar national histories rather 
than electing to follow blind emulation.31  
 
 
30 The 2015 Country Attractiveness Index (for VC and PE investors) assesses the status of 120 countries. 
31 To date, only Israel has also been able to harvest a comparable (albeit much smaller) civilian innovation 
premium from its high defense spending unlike Russia or South Africa.  
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What nations may be able to do is to understand better the reasons and precursors for the 
formation of US entrepreneurial ecosystem for the financing of young and novel industries in 
order to make their own adaptations. Israel has colonized an early-stage VC space very 
successfully as an off-shoring of US technology particularly (but not exclusively) in its civil 
application of originally military products and services, e.g. encryption and other security 
software. Similarly, Ireland has historically and currently32 been successful as a low tax 
European entrepôt and destination for foreign corporations wishing to have a trading base 
within the European Union. For Finland, its decision to become an innovation-based, 
knowledge economy was hugely influenced by the collapse of its Soviet export market in the 
early 1990s (Sabel and Saxenian, 2008) and latterly the demise of Nokia. The need to finance 
speculative innovative ideas outside traditional financing and commercial channels has led to 
Finnish government support for the emergence of a VC industry since the mid 1990s (Maula 
and Murray, 2003; Murray et al., 2009). In the developing world, India created a vibrant VC 
industry in response to the emergence of the outsourced software services industry (Dossani 
and Kenney, 2002) while South Africa has struggled to develop a VC industry despite a 
promising enabling environment (Lingelbach et al., 2008).  
 
Policy makers and politicians may prefer to focus on putative outcome rather than the 
enabling conditions. This myopia remains despite a growing interest in the importance of 
entrepreneurial ecosystems as a necessary condition for successful VC activity. Groh et al’s 
(2015) conclusion that the depth of economic activity and robust governance/protection 
procedures are two key determinants places the US at the top of the index and in turn 
questions the plausibility of successful VC industries in a host of developing or transitional 
nations.33 
 
The unique model of Silicon Valley continues to impress policymakers and politicians 
worldwide. Those non-USA centres that have founded successful exemplars in Europe and 
increasingly Asia are frequently characterized by their very strong links with American VC 
finance and their familiarity with the meritocratic and technology-accepting service and 
product markets of the North America. However, such relationships require reciprocal 
benefits, the production of which are likely to be beyond the majority of regions or countries. 
The innovative density of a Cambridge/London/Oxford triangle is as likely to be as difficult 
to emulate as Silicon Valley itself. For those considering the creation of viable and 
sustainable VC industries, it is likely that their regions will have to be characterized by 
accessible communities of demanding and independent consumers serviced by innovations 
systems that are globally competent. These are very strong conditions for VC industry entry 
and survival. 
 
 
M4:  If you believe that all men are born equal – don’t become a venture capitalist. 
Socialists make lousy venture capitalists. 
 
The state as ‘wimp’  
 
 
32 See contemporary evidence of a Celtic recovery in The Economist 21st November, 2015, p82. 
33 These two criteria will make venture capital investment in mainland China a particularly challenging activity 
for investors. See Clissold (2004) salutary experience as an early-entrant VC investor in China.   
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One of the biggest challenges for policy makers in seeking to implement a US model of VC 
activity is to attempt to introduce a new modus operandi without also understanding and 
replicating the social and cultural underpinnings of the imported (USA) model. Classic VC 
activity relies on market forces as the pre-eminent allocation and signaling mechanisms. As 
with Darwin’s evolutionary theory of natural selection, entrepreneurial markets allow 
relatively few winners but produce many losers. To operate in this market takes a form of 
physical and mental toughness that appears unusually pre-eminent in the Anglo-Saxon 
competitive and individualistic culture.34 Max Weber in 1904 termed this set of enabling 
characteristics, the ‘Protestant Ethic’. It contrasts strongly with a more paternal European 
social models in which the state is both protector and allocator of publicly owned resources.35 
The US model is meritocratic and elitist. Its citizens have a passion for winning and 
broadcasting the benefits of success. This muscular American economic individualism can be 
compared with, in Hofstede’s (2001) terms, the lower ‘masculinity’ of, for example, Nordic 
economies with their preferred emphasis on a societal and collectivist ethic.  
 
Given the aggressively competitive and meritocratic nature of VC activity it is perhaps not 
surprising that the USA and the UK, as America’s closest European exemplar, remain the two 
pre-eminent examples of a national VC industry in its purest form.36 This is reflected in the 
national allocation of institutional investors’ alternative asset financings. Yet, governments 
have continuously viewed VC as a means by which non-commercial social and 
developmental goals could also be achieved.  Repeatedly, Western governments have 
attempted to introduce fairness, equity and balance into the entrepreneurship policy equation 
including the choice of financial instruments. Government incentives that do not discriminate 
in favor of its more entrepreneurial citizens - who often are better educated, richer and/or 
more foreign - may unwittingly trade economic advantage for apparent social equity. By its 
very nature, VC funds will accept a small minority of all enterprise opportunities appraised 
(Gompers and Lerner, 2004). Frequently, this initial acceptance rate is reported as below one 
percent for popular venture capitalist firms.  
 
The continuing predilection of governments to seek to use venture capital as a complement to 
social entrepreneurship is most evidently seen in its publicly supported VC programmes to 
enhance economic activity in peripheral regions, and in initiatives targeted at disadvantaged 
groups, e.g. inner-city deprivation or gender discrimination. We do not challenge the right of 
government to construct such programmes nor do we question their laudable motives. Rather, 
we wish to posit whether or not the use of venture capital for social prescription fails to 
understand the drivers for success in early-stage equity investment or the personal 
motivations driving the actions of the most successful GP teams.  
 
Venture capital illustrates the structural conflict between government’s desired goals and 
those of its agents which are contracted to manage publicly supported VC funds. The 
managing of hybrid VC activity is essentially the orchestrating of compromise to achieve 
 
34 This is not to suggest that entrepreneurial success is exclusive to the Anglo-Saxon culture. 
35 This question of different styles of capitalism with different roles for the state has assumed enormous 
importance in the chaotic capital markets of the GFC in 2008. (See The Economist 4th October (2008 pp45-46. 
36 Many readers of this paper will immediately cite the rise of VC in the Peoples’ Republic of China. However, 
it is argued that this latter VC industry is hugely influenced by the government and communist party interests. 
Bruton and Ahlstrom (2003) argue that the that China's institutional environment creates a number of significant 
differences from the Western practice. 
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optimal effect. These conflicting goals may help explain the performance differences 
frequently found between government and private VC funds (Alperovych et al, 2018; 
Brander et al, 2010). 
 
 
M5: Ventures capitalists believe that seed capital is very important – so long as they 
don’t have to provide it. 
 
The state as ‘pocket money’  
 
In an early British Venture Capital Association sponsored survey in 1990, the top twenty 
venture capitalists in the UK were asked their opinion as to the greatest shortcoming of the 
industry in its first decade of significant operation (Murray, 1992).37 The respondents, who 
included representatives from both ‘classic’ VC and Private Equity (Management Buy Out) 
fund managers, were unanimous in their opinions. They cited the inability of the UK to find a 
means of financing start-up and early-stage, high potential enterprises as successfully as their 
VC peers in the USA. The dearth of seed funding was particularly noted. This situation 
remains similar more than a quarter of a century later. Outside government supported 
programmes, there are very few specialist, early-stage risk, capital providers. Using Europe-
wide industry statistics, venture capital investment has seen uninterrupted growth for eight 
years. Yet, seed capital represented 0.9% of All Private Equity investment activity (i.e. 
VC+PE) of EURO 94 billion; and 8% of total European VC investment of 10.6 billion in 
2019. Total VC (seed, start-up and later stage) in turn represented 11.3% of total investment 
activity (Invest Europe, 2020). 
 
 
 
37 The author arranged for the 1990 survey to be announced in the Financial Times. The article stated that the 
researcher would meet the UK industry’s top VC investors as identified by the British Venture Capital 
Association. Accordingly, some forty plus chairman and CEOs of venture capital companies contacted the 
author uninvited in order to request that he meet them urgently! 
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Seed and other very early-stage risk capital has remained a chronically unsuccessful 
investment focus for a majority of investors. Possible exceptions include established private 
equity investors in the innovation hubs of East and West Coast America and, more recently, 
those fortunate enough to invest early in widely publicised Unicorn IPOs. Regardless of 
investment outcomes, seed investment targeted primarily at high potential but very risky 
opportunities has been seen by governments as an extremely important complement to 
contemporary innovation policies. For technology-based new enterprises with 
products/services yet to be commercialized, seed and other early-stage venture capital 
investment combine multiple uncertainties from technology, market and managerial sources. 
In addition, seed investing is particularly unattractive for VC fund managers in that it 
demands very considerable managerial input from the GP of the VC firm into the fledgling 
enterprises while at the same time often employing very little capital from the funds under 
management. (The rapid allocation of very large sums of equity finance to potential unicorn 
firms, is one of the significant attractions of this novel model of development.). In contrast to 
classic venture capital, private equity deals, and predominantly Management Buy-Outs 
(MBOs), have allowed increasing sums of equity, leveraged by debt, to be applied to 
restructuring established companies with known histories, financials, and markets. Invest 
Europe figures over the same period (2012-2019) show MBO accounting for 71% of total 
investments. Five years later, MBOs still represented 69% of all investment activity in 
Europe although total investment had more than doubled from Euros 41.3 to 94 billion 
(Invest Europe, 2020) 
 
Accordingly, the traditional European VC model with its initial concentration of small, 
specialist early-stage funds (Murray, 1998) has been frequently characterized by very low 
returns and several failures.  This has resulted in an exit of commercial focused VC firms 
from this market which practicably no longer exists outside government intervention. Seed, 
start-up and early-stage financing is now a minor and residual area of the total private equity 
market where public funded VC firms predominate (Kramer-Eis, 2015; Small Business 
Service, 2006 a and b; Pierrakis and Mason, 2008).  
 
Classic VC funds in Europe have addressed this challenging asymmetry between the (high) 
management costs incurred and the (low) returns generated from the modest funds managed 
by either abandoning seed activity or by increasing funds under management and refocusing 
activities on later stage growth and development capital investments. A majority of surviving 
VC general partnerships in the UK, which started before year 2000, have reallocated their 
efforts entirely from VC to PE deals.  
 
The US model of seed investing implicitly recognizes that seed capital is, in isolation, not a 
viable commercial product, at least not when delivered by a VC fund. Rather, it is the first, 
‘intelligence seeking’ stage of a holistic investment process that will normally provide 
multiple rounds of follow-on finance to successful firms up to an exit event via either an IPO 
or a trade sale. Accordingly, US VC firms undertaking seed capital are multi-stage investors 
and are frequently managing aggregate funds in excess of one billion US dollars. Seed 
investment is essentially a ‘financial option’ on a potentially interesting company and/or new 
technology/innovation in a VC strategy termed by some as ‘spray and pray’ (Ewens et al, 
2015). By such means, the strategically important but extraordinarily high risk/return ratio of 
seed capital deals are attenuated in being amortized across the total range of activities of the 
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fund (Dimov and Murray, 2007). This model of VC funds requires sufficient finance in the 
fund in order to finance multiple rounds of growth capital up until the portfolio firm’s 
successful exit can be realised. It replaces specialist early-stage investors which restrict their 
activities to the earlier stages of the firm’s evolution. In practice, the majority of specialist 
activity in seed and other early investment stages have been assumed by Business Angels 
investors either individually or in networks (BANs)38. In this contemporary configuration of 
the ‘financing escalator’, particularly in the USA and the UK with their advanced VC/PE 
infrastructures, VC is only one choice of ‘follow-on’ financing after the business angels have 
assumed the responsibility for initial investment.39 
 
Current industry trends corroborate the VCs’ long-run ambivalence to providing early-stage 
finance provision without public support. Accordingly, post both the 2000 ‘technology 
bubble’ and the 2008 ‘global financial crisis’, it has been the state which has been obliged to 
take on the primary burden for financing early-stage investments both directly, via grants, 
RandD and investor tax incentives, and in hybrid fund arrangements with both VC and BA 
investors. 
 
 
M6: The archetype venture capitalist has razor sharp teeth, can smell blood at three 
kilometers, has a paranoid/psychotic need to achieve lucrative deals, reveres capital 
gain above all things … and likes flower arranging.  
 
The state as ‘innocent abroad’ 
 
Writing over two millennia ago, Sun Tzu argued in his classic treatise, The Art of War, 
“know the enemy and know yourself” (1998: 26). There is perhaps little to separate business 
partners and enemies in this strategic sense. In order for the state to work effectively with 
venture capitalists, policy makers need to understand the modus operandi of the private sector 
organizations and commercial managements with which they wish to collaborate. Without a 
detailed understanding of the instrumentality and aggressively meritocratic culture of the risk 
capital sector, there is a high probability that government will not be able to engineer 
sufficiently attractive incentives to ensure investment professionals’ collaboration. Perhaps 
even more likely, less experienced public departments will devise incentives that are 
inappropriately generous, thereby diminishing the potential public welfare by the degree of 
over payment to their private agents. 
 
Venture capitalists have very demanding interests as investors. Ideally, they wish for a very 
high return with negligible risk. They do not court risk but rather manage it professionally – 
for a price broadly measured in their significant and preferential ownership of the portfolio 
company’s stock. Governments’ interest in encouraging VC firms to invest in early-stage 
activities requires the incentivization of GPs which would otherwise often seek to moderate 
risk by abandoning start-up activity and moving toward later-stage and more certain PE 
 
38 Business Angels, like specialist early-stage VC funds, are vulnerable to seeing their share ownership in a 
promising venture severely diluted as they seek later tranches of capital beyond their own resources in order to 
grow the new enterprise.  
39 The fact that several Western governments incentivise Business Angels, many of whom cannot be seen as 
professional investors, to undertake investments at the most risky and uncertain stage of the firm cycle (and 
which has become unattractive to professional VC managers) does raise some pressing ethical questions. 
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investments. Thus, it becomes important for policy makers to understand the motivations of 
the private collaborators in order to design incentives that achieve mutually desired 
outcomes. 
 
In reality, the government will rarely attract the most successful venture capitalists to engage 
in hybrid activities, at least in countries with already-established private equity and venture 
capital industries. The investment record of such general partnerships ensures that they are 
well known to institutional investors. The best GPs have a waiting list of institutional 
investors wishing to be included in their next fund raising. Similarly, they are the first choice 
of the most talented entrepreneurs who wish for a ‘certification effect’ from the chosen 
investor. Thus, the partnerships available to the state are either VC firms with less enviable 
track records or, historically, commercial but untested investment teams anxious to enter the 
VC/PE market and seeing a government leveraged fund as one means of entry. For such 
managers, the hybrid fund becomes a ‘loose brick’ in the high wall surrounding the VC/PE 
community (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). If such an investment team can be accepted and can 
subsequently demonstrate a clear competence as professional equity investors, they have the 
opportunity to raise substantial follow-on funds from private institutional investors on the 
back of their initial fund’s performance. Thus, publicly supported hybrid funds have become 
one of the few conduits by which new entrants can enter a rapidly maturing and consolidating 
VC and PE market. 
 
As the VC industry has grown and matured, the state needs to understand clearly the terms 
and conditions which may reasonably be demanded of a VC co-investment partner. Just as 
institutional LPs hire ‘gatekeepers’ to inform them as to the most attractive VC managers and 
to understand contractual norms, likewise government needs to understand in detail the 
nature of its proposed relationship with a VC agent if both parties are to create an effective 
investment vehicle. Over time, the state has increasingly recognized its own negotiating 
power as usually the largest single investor in a hybrid fund. More recent calls for managing 
hybrid VC funds have been put out to public tender including the UK’s Enterprise Capital 
Fund which clearly states in its Guidance for Prospective Managers (British Business Bank, 
2014) the expectations and demands placed on a prospective GP. Somewhat ironically, the 
GP applicants are now subject to the same type of analytical scrutiny that they commonly 
impose on potential investee firms. The UK government through its involvement in a series 
of new VC fund programs since 1997 has been able to accumulate its own professional 
competence in both designing and staffing public/private investment funds.40 With greater 
enterprise policy networking, venture focused skills sets are now being disseminated between 
policy makers from several countries. As the playing field has leveled, venture capitalists 
now need to understand ‘the nature of the (public) beast’ as much as the policy makers need 
to understand the interests and motivations of their putative, private sector agents. 
 
 
M7: Sequoia, Benchmark, and Index require their investors to wait ten years (and 
more) for full fund returns – government would prefer not to wait.  
 
The state as ‘importunate’  
 
 
40 In the UK, this has culminated in the creation of the government-owned British Business Bank in 2012. 
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There is a conflict between the duration of political and investment cycles. Both parties face 
significant time costs. For VCs, the effect is to orientate investments to sectors with quick 
returns, e.g. ICT, social media, and near-market technology commercialisation.  For 
government, quick policy gains reap political rewards.  
 
In order to engage successfully with the VC industry and meet its own objectives, the state 
has had to learn the routines by which this specialist form of entrepreneurial finance is 
conducted. These industry practices often evolve for highly pragmatic reasons. Equity 
funding in a classic VC scenario will follow the J Curve (Meyer and Mathonet, 2005) with 
the cumulative value of the fund being less than the money committed for the first years of 
the fund’s operations. Bürgel (2000) in one of the first forensic studies of VC performance 
analyzed detailed investment cash flows on a sample of some eighty UK based funds. He 
demonstrated that funds typically did not start to show a positive net gain in value until 
around the fifth year of operation. It is because of the long gestation of many young 
enterprises before demonstrating any significant commercial value (Miller and Friesen, 1984; 
Agarwal and Audretsch, 2001) that the GPs have to require of limited partners that their 
investment is locked in for an industry standard (in the US and Europe) of a minimum ten 
year period.  
 
Considerable time is needed to demonstrate unequivocally the investment performance of a 
VC fund. The more complex the sector invested in, the longer this time period is likely to 
be.41 This lag is difficult for the state particularly as the provision of ‘cheap’ public financing 
to a private investor raises considerable governance issues. The state rightly wishes to see the 
positive consequences of its risk bearing actions. Yet, the demands made on such funds for 
evidence of success or, more vaguely, ‘public value-added’ are often importunate if made 
unrealistically early into the investment cycle. Auditing the ‘net present value’ of a highly 
immature portfolio firm is illusory and the industry recommended practice of carrying 
investments ‘at cost’ until an independent evaluation event is appropriate given the high 
uncertainty. It is a source of added pressure on less informed investors that failed investments 
are much more likely to be realized before investment successes in a fund. In the argot of the 
VC industry: ‘lemons ripen before plums’. 
 
The need to consider time effects on the investment cycle is a key issue in ensuring informed 
governance and audit practices. Timing can also have a huge influence on a VC programme’s 
evaluation (Nightingale et al., 2009). Yet, it remains the exception for government 
programmes to have robust quantitative evaluation methodologies defined before a new 
programme is launched. Critically, the agreement among all parties for the full provision of 
investment performance data to government assessors and their active involvement in a 
staged (interim and final) evaluation process prior to the release of government funding is 
rarely secured. Similarly, few governments are prepared to make public the independent 
evaluations of such programmes.42 Here, the OECD, the European Commission and The 
World Bank have a valuable role in disseminating good practice and publishing comparative 
performance data. Their efforts, and those of academic researchers, have been materially 
 
41 VC firms concentrate predominantly on ‘near to market’ technologies including software, internet service, 
ecommerce. The greater time needed to realize returns in medicine and green technology can be much longer 
and more problematic for an investor. 
42 Here, the Nordic governments should be congratulated for the transparency of their GVC evaluations. 
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assisted by the growing availability and quality of international data sets focused specifically 
on venture capital and private equity activity and performance. 
 
 
M8: Specialist users of advanced technological products and services rarely insist that 
the technology they purchase was conceived, designed and manufactured in a nomadic 
community of two hundred souls on the north side of a fjord some five hundred miles 
from the nearest Starbucks.  
 
The state as ‘romantic or holy fool’  
 
VC is used by the state as a tool to support enterprise and innovation. It is also frequently 
given a social distributive role by government. Western democratic states generally recognize 
a constitutional responsibility to protect and nurture the welfare of all of the diverse 
communities and groups of citizens within their national borders. This is in part articulated in 
a redistributive function that transfers resources from the nation’s centers of highest 
economic activity to regions or communities more remote or otherwise disadvantaged. A 
significant proportion of total public activity is allocated to these tasks and involves 
education, training, employment and capital investment activities across a range of public 
administration offices.  
 
At the same time as having a range of social policy actions, the state is also interested in 
stimulating future economic activity by investing in new innovative and productive capacity 
both at the research and commercial stages. Resources to create new high-tech industries are 
attractive to all regions in an economy and none more so than for economically depressed 
regions that have often declined from an illustrious industrial past. Yet, the reality of scale 
and scope advantages, particularly within networked economies demonstrating exponential 
benefits of proximity and growth, is that new investment in technology and other ‘new 
knowledge’ assets is likely to be much more fruitful if added incrementally alongside existing 
assets in so-called ‘high-tech clusters’. Agglomeration economics privileges, via multiple 
spillovers, established innovation centres (Audretsch and Feldman, 1996; Porter, 1998). 
 
Thus, policy makers face a conflict between their heads and their hearts. The more efficient 
allocative decision would be to invest in existing areas of research excellence where marginal 
benefits outweigh marginal costs. At best, most countries outside the largest world economies 
will only have a very small number, if any, of centres of genuinely world-class technology. 
But the political process assumes responsibility for socially redistributive actions regardless 
of efficiency arguments. In an ideal world, the stage would be set for an informed debate over 
priorities, means and ends. The reality is often quite different. 
 
Much of regional policy is more accurately understood as a process of social transfer despite 
being presented as an economic investment in enterprise/innovative capacity. Publicly 
supported VC funds are particularly vulnerable to being 'hijacked' by social and regional 
interests. Venture capital is politically attractive and smacks of modernity with highly 
educated and well paid work forces, clean industries and warm images of California. As a 
result, less economically developed regions of many advanced Western economies (and some 
developing countries) are characterized by the presence of small, early-stage VC funds. They 
commonly do not survive beyond the exhaustion of the public subsidy. (Such hybrid funds 
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for obvious reasons are rarely in receipt of genuine ‘matched financing’ from private 
investors.) They are the outward manifestation of policies that have uncritically seen the link 
between venture capital and innovation as causal and sufficient. The overlaying of a 
European economic development and investment infrastructure through the European Union 
can add another layer of opportunity and sometimes policy confusion for European states. 
Indeed, the rules of much of European regional development funds activity can proscribe 
placing risk finance into areas which are not officially classified as economically 
disadvantaged. The term ‘disadvantaged’ can often be interpreted as regions that have neither 
the supply nor the quality of universities, research laboratories, large and small technology 
businesses, knowledge workers or managerial manpower. Yet each of these human capital 
resources is required for the construction an innovation ecosystem able to be augmented by 
venture capital activity. Thus, the very regions that can use this funding least effectively are 
often the places most likely to be in receipt of this form of social financing. Hans Christian 
Andersen was prescient. It is not just emperors who do not have new clothes. Regions can 
sometimes be equally naked. 
 
In explaining the misallocation of venture finance activities into social programs, we are not 
suggesting that poor or less advantaged regions are less deserving and/or should be excluded. 
In contemporary society such discrimination should be unacceptable. What we are suggesting 
is that to dragoon a specific set of (innovation/enterprise) policy instruments in order to 
engage in inappropriate (social) policy actions is likely to be sub-optimal for both policy 
goals, irrespective of the criteria employed. Frequently, the objective of locally employed 
public servants is to maximize inward transfers of public monies regardless of the 
opportunity cost of this allocation. Thus, in the case of a VC initiative, antecedent questions 
determining the quality and volume of technological opportunities sufficient to sustain a VC 
fund structure with a reasonable probability of attractive financial returns are rarely asked. 
Rather, the investment case and subsequent evaluation is couched in less precise terms of 
equality, social spill-overs and infrastructure improvements. In these rather common 
circumstances, public attempts to subsidize the emergence of a local VC industry in 
unconducive environments have rarely resulted in commercially viable, long-run investment 
entities. 
 
 
M9: The good thing about evaluating seed and incubator funds on the cost of capital 
(IRR) to the government is that it is relatively unambiguous, clear and simple. The bad 
thing is that such a method of evaluation is completely inappropriate.  
 
The state as ‘irrational rationalist’  
 
Private Equity has become in the last twenty-five years a new ‘alternative asset class’ 
primarily available for institutional investors that wish to introduce a further level of diversity 
and variance into their core portfolios of equities, bonds and other investments (see the 
industry promotional literature of the NVCA, BVCA, EVCA/Initiative Europe). Early 
investors into upper-quartile VC and private equity funds have seen highly attractive, long 
term returns (Rosa and Raade, 2006; BVCA, 2019; European Investment Fund 2017; and 
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Initiative Europe, 201943). A core requirement of an asset class is sufficiently long-term and 
credible quantitative metrics in order that professional investors and actuaries may be able to 
construct mixed instrument portfolios of desired risk/return trade-offs. The very nature of a 
typically ten-year, fixed term VC fund is such that performance metrics are not instantly 
available compared to that of a traded public stock. However, over the investment cycle, 
investors can gain an increasingly accurate representation of terminal fund performance from 
year five and beyond (Bürgel, op cit.). Internal Rate of Return and capital gain multiples are 
the two most commonly accessible measurements of VC fund performance (Fenn et al., 
1995; Gompers and Lerner, 1999). Such measures which reflect the opportunity costs of 
investment allocations are entirely appropriate for commercial investors in their assessment 
of the effectiveness of the general partners of their funds. Over time, standardized investment 
guidelines imposed by VC and PE national associations on their members have reduced the 
idiosyncrasies and occasionally misinformation of GPs’ performance reporting to 
institutional investors (LPs).44 
 
It is entirely reasonable that early-stage funds conform to industry practice in their reporting 
procedures. However, when such funds are public/private hybrids, the information provided 
only allows for a strictly economic or commercial evaluation. While this is of pre-eminent 
importance to the private partners in such a relationship, it is only of partial value to the 
public investor. It needs to be remembered that most public LPs agree to accept subordinated 
returns in order to ensure the necessary leverage incentives to their private co-investors in the 
fund. For the public investor, often requiring a base return determined by the cost of the 
state’s capital, a commercially attractive return is important primarily in ensuring the 
continued participation of the private partners as investors and mentors in potentially valuable 
young firms. The objective of their public support of the hybrid fund is in the long run, public 
welfare returns contingent on the new investment activity. Thus, the state is primarily 
interested in creating an infrastructure and competencies conducive to the accelerated 
production of new knowledge assets and, critically, their effective commercial exploitation.  
 
The celebrated Israeli Yozma Program started in 1993 as a public initiative from the Office of 
the Chief Scientist before being privatized in 1997. It signaled these wider interests by 
offering, at its formation, to sell the public involvement in the ten new VC funds created by 
the program back to the participating private investors within the first five years.45 In essence, 
the Israeli state acted as a catalyst in promoting the emergence of a VC industry. It then 
withdrew from a direct commercial involvement when the investment results clearly 
indicated the commercial viability of investment activities fueled by Israeli intellectual 
property and publicly supported, advanced research capabilities (Avnimelech et al., 2004). In 
 
43 The British and European VC industries, via their industry bodies produce a range of publicly available 
research reports detailing investment activity and performance on an annual basis. See for example: 
https://www.bvca.co.uk/Research. The USA similarly produces activity and performance details via the NVCA. 
In each case, the national associations use a variety of specialist data collection and analyses companies to 
ensure a measure of ‘independence’ in the analyses presented. 
 
44 It is interesting to note how weak institutional investors’ influence on GP practices, fees and rewards systems 
has been in the VC and PE industries until recent times. The industry has been noteworthy in its lack of 
transparency on both its costs and performance until the huge scale of contemporary investment funds involved 
has made such requirements an imperative. 
45 While the Israeli government required a predetermined exit premium, private partners in eight of the ten 
supported funds bought out the Israeli public interest to continue as exclusively private VC funds. 
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the USA, the Small Business Administration’s SBIC program is arguably the best known, 
and most emulated, of such state-assisted schemes. However, the running of two quite 
separate SBIC schemes has added some confusion. The debenture SBIC program, which was 
created in 1958 and uses the state to facilitate loans to licensed SBICs in order to leverage 
private capital, has been judged a success (US Small Business Administration, 2003). A 
second program, the participating securities SBICs, started as an experiment in 1994 and was 
designed to encourage early-stage investments by the SBA investing additional equity 
directly in the SBICs via a public investment. This latter scheme was terminated in 2004 after 
the sharp market turndown in technology stocks in the year 2000 left the SBA with a total 
investment exposure of over $11 billion.  
 
A strictly commercial appraisal would be positive to both the Israeli Yozma (Avnimelech, 
2009) program and the UK’s 3i (Investors In Industry) initiative which was also successfully 
privatized in 1994 just under fifty years after its creation. The SBA’s debenture SBICs would 
be seen as commercially positive, despite many failed funds, and the participating securities 
variant would be judged a commercial failure. Yet, a strictly commercial analysis of 
investment returns would greatly underestimate the impact of these three publicly sponsored 
programmes on three of the largest and most successful VC industries in the world. The US 
and UK programs were materially responsible for training the first national cohort of 
professional venture capitalists/fund managers in the post war period up until the early/mid 
1980s. Similarly, the Yozma program purposely replicated an advanced risk capital 
investment infrastructure in Israel by the late the 1990s (Avnimelech, 2009). Their policy 
impact has been very considerably larger than an exclusively economic analysis of fund 
returns would suggest. 
 
However, all too often, the state’s efforts are measured against the benchmark of private 
investor interests. Wider cost benefit analyses incorporating mechanisms that price the 
externalities and spillovers of the fund’s activities are an exception. For example, the training 
of investment managers; the orientation of university research departments to commercial 
spin-out activities; the construction of a professional SME support network  
(aka. ‘ecosystem’) of accountants, lawyers, patent attorneys etc.; and the dissemination of 
innovative practices throughout the wider business community are each noteworthy as 
evaluation criteria. They are frequently absent from programme evaluations conducted by 
public agencies. This is not to argue that the performance of the fund is of secondary 
relevance to the state. A failed fund is likely to produce little of the desired externalities and 
spillovers noted. However, the investment activity’s financial performance is a necessary but 
insufficient benchmark. Public program evaluations have to address both the advantages and 
limitations of using market measures in a policy context if they are not to draw erroneous 
policy conclusions. 
 
 
M10: It is evident that the Institutions of State can change and adapt to meet new ideas 
and opportunities. After all, the Dark Ages in Europe only lasted five hundred years. 
 
The state as ‘architect not mechanic’  
 
One can ‘kick start’ a motorbike … but not a VC industry. It is all too infrequently noted that 
the evolution of a credible VC industry is measured in decades rather than in single years (see 
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issues of ‘path dependency’ in M2). It is also tempting for policy makers to concentrate on 
the ‘tactics’ of setting up a new fund without a wider understanding of the necessary 
‘strategies’ that need to be put into place to create a conducive on-going environment for risk 
capital activity. As noted, a frequent question posed by policy makers is: how can one 
emulate the successes of a US or UK VC industry? In seeking to answer this question, the 
new institutional economics of North (1990 and 2005) and others is of considerable utility. 
These scholars have recognized, in seeking to define supportive entrepreneurial and 
investment environments, the critical importance of ‘context’ and ‘the rule of law’ 
(Alperovych et al, 2018; La Porta et al., 1997 and 2000). A growing awareness of the 
importance of context is also similarly being seen in the field of entrepreneurship research 
and policy formation (Audretsch, Grilo et al. 2007) where there is an increased recognition of 
the need to establish supportive ecosystems complementary to individual entrepreneurial 
activity. To date, entrepreneurship as a subject area has largely been dominated by 
individual-level and dispositional approaches (Shane and Venkataraman 2000, Shane 2003, 
Sorensen 2007).46 Accordingly, the three conditions that Gilson (2003) argues must exist 
simultaneously if a VC industry is to emerge - i.e. entrepreneurs; funds for investment; and 
an investment vehicle that creates the right incentives - are quite correct. However, they too 
are ‘necessary but not sufficient’ conditions. Their creation and employment is only possible 
if institutional precursors allow a benign environment in which such resources can be 
mobilized. 
 
For the innovator, access to legal protection and redress can be critical. An abiding concern 
as to the piracy of their intellectual property by dishonest firms both at home and abroad is 
one of the single most defining characteristics of the young innovative firm. The need to 
protect their intellectual assets and the associated economic rents strongly influences how, 
when and where they announce innovations, set up their businesses, protect their IP, sell their 
products and services and with whom they will trade and collaborate (Coeurderoy and 
Murray, 2008). The security provided by the institutional and legal environments to 
vulnerable young firms influences the location decision (OECD, 2018b; World Bank, 2020). 
Without the entrepreneur’s confidence in the protection of the firm’s valuable and innovative 
assets via recourse to national institutions that defend individual property rights regardless of 
the status of the owner (foreigner/citizen, large firm/start-up firm etc.), the economy’s 
credibility is severely undermined. 
 
Pettigrew (2008) rightly observed that government agencies must focus on both policy and 
process.47 The processes by which a viable VC industry emerges still remains poorly 
understood. Market-oriented programs to stimulate VC tend to focus both on enabling 
contexts and incentives that will attract private sector involvement and co-investment.48 Yet, 
the relatively small number of sustainable, national VC industries in existence to date - 
despite governments’ continued interest in entrepreneurial finance - indicates that policy and 
process are not yet fully integrated.  
 
 
46 We are grateful to Erkko Autio for guidance in discussions on the role of context to Entrepreneurial research. 
47 Seminar address at the Academy of Management’s Annual Conference, Anaheim, California August 2008 
48 The UK government and the Small Business Service post 1997 would be an exemplar of market-oriented 
policies with a strong co-investment focus. The Regional VC Funds, The Enterprise Capital Funds, the High-
Tech Fund and the more socially focused Bridges Fund were each launched with public money for a primarily 
policy purpose yet managed by strongly incentivized private sector agents. 
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Concluding Comments 
 
In the highly dynamic world of VC, several contemporary changes that may have longer term 
relevance are evident. However, this paper has not sought to address the influence of, for 
example, unicorn companies on the behaviour of VC investors despite their material impact. 
Nor has this paper looked at the role of equity crowdfunding which may change the 
economics of VC investment at the very earliest stages of the investment cycle. Finally, the 
accelerating interest of China in national and global VC activity has been substantial for both 
political and economic reasons. But again, although this particular variant of government VC 
merits considerable attention by academics and policy makers alike, a greater understanding 
of the PRC’s actions must be left to another paper.  
 
What this revision of the original 2010 meditations paper has sought to do it to confirm the 
longer-term characteristics – and vulnerabilities and opportunities – of the state engaging 
directly with the capital markets in order to establish and maintain de novo early-stage 
venture capital activity.  
 
The state’s pursuance of additional if not different goals from the traditional private VC and 
investor partners means that there is room for both collaboration and conflict. The emergence 
of the state as the single biggest investor in the early-stage VC market in several countries 
over the period since the collapse in the international market for new technology stocks in the 
year 2000, and more recently following the global financial crisis of 2007-9, indicates the 
centrality of the government’s role in the financing of both enterprise and innovation via the 
platform of start-ups and young companies. This focus is a substantial and continuing policy 
ambition for governments in both the developed and (increasingly) the developing world. 
 
This hands-on behavior of the state and its agents means that policy makers have to learn 
‘how to do venture capital’ in order to craft effective policy instruments that encourage public 
and private co-investment activity. Ignorance within financial communities holding strong 
vested interests encourages moral hazard. It is to inform this governmental learning process 
that the Ten Meditations are promulgated. Essentially, they seek to reinforce a number of key 
and generic messages related to the state’s actions and ambitions:  
 
• The creation of a sustainable VC industry is measured in decades 
• Policy makers have to understand profoundly (the nature and timing of) 
changing industry dynamics  
• The incentives for the private sector to engage have to be material, and aligned 
with public goals 
• Using venture capital to achieve social goals may often be ‘a bridge too far’ 
• Venture capital can only flourish in benign and supportive (legal and fiscal) 
environments for enterprise and entrepreneurs 
• Few countries have the scale and scope of scientific and technological 
innovation to supply exclusively the needs of a viable and sustainable, 
domestic VC industry 
• For a majority of nations, a successful VC industry will require a transnational 
perspective and behaviour 
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With relatively few exceptions, historic Government intervention in early-stage VC activity 
has rarely been successful. Where it has succeeded, programme designers have demonstrated 
a clear understanding of the diverse interests, actions and possible complementarities of both 
public and private participants. In short, government has had to emulated and adapt 
successful venture capitalists' behaviour and professionalism in their crafting of policy 
instruments. They have also had to build and strengthen the conducive institutional 
environments or ecosystems which are required for high growth firms to flourish. There are 
indications that public policy makers are learning these lessons. 
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